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CompetitionCompetitive interactions between individuals are ubiquitous in human societies. Auctions
represent an institutionalized context for these interactions, a context where individuals
frequently make non-optimal decisions. In particular, competition in auctions can lead to
overbidding, resulting in the so-called winner’s curse, often explained by invoking emo-
tional arousal. In this study, we investigated an alternative possibility, namely that com-
petitors’ bids are construed as a source of information about the good’s common value
thereby inﬂuencing an individuals’ private value estimate. We tested this hypothesis by
asking participants to bid in a repeated all-pay auction game for ﬁve different real items.
Crucially, participants had to rank the auction items for their preference before and after
the experiment. We observed a clear relation between auction dynamics and preference
change. We found that low competition reduced preference while high competition
increased preference. Our ﬁndings support a view that competitors’ bids in auction games
are perceived as valid social signal for the common value of an item. We suggest that this
inﬂuence of social information constitutes a major cause for the frequently observed devi-
ations from optimality in auctions.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CCBY
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
Competition is integral to human social life (Festinger,
1954; Kilduff, Elfenbein, & Staw, 2010). It is surprising that
decisions in competition contexts often deviate from
rational choice even with extensive experience
(Bazerman & Samuelson, 1983; Kagel & Richard, 2001;
Lind & Plott, 1991). A well-studied example of such subop-
timal behavior is the so-called winner’s curse in auctions
where the winner often overbids the common (realizable)
value of an object (Thaler, 1988). This effect has consis-
tently been demonstrated in laboratory (Bazerman &
Samuelson, 1983) and ﬁeld settings (Carpenter, Holmes,
& Matthews, 2008). A proposed cause for the deviationfrom rational choice is that individuals derive utility not
only from the object itself but also from winning against
competitors (for a review on further possible causes of
overbidding see (Sheremeta, 2013)). This view accords
with the observation that social interactions during com-
petition elicit emotional arousal (Ku, Malhotra, &
Murnighan, 2005) that individuals experience as a joy of
winning respectively fear of losing (Delgado, Schotter,
Ozbay, & Phelps, 2008; van den Bos et al., 2008).
However, apparent overbidding could also be due to an
increase in the bidder’s actual preference for the good.
When the true (private) value of a good is uncertain (e.g.
in art auctions), competitors’ bids can be taken as informa-
tion about the true value, whichmay drive updates to one’s
own estimated value of the good. The value of a novel
object is estimated by pooling previous experience with
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associated with uncertainty. By integrating over personal
and social information sources, uncertainty can be reduced
(Morgan, Rendell, Ehn, Hoppitt, & Laland, 2011; Rendell
et al., 2011; Toelch et al., 2009). The behavior of competi-
tors could thus serve as a proxy for the common value
(Beggs & Graddy, 2009; Campbell-Meiklejohn, Bach,
Roepstorff, Dolan, & Frith, 2010; Hayes, Shogren, Shin, &
Kliebenstein, 1995; Nicolle et al., 2012; Suzuki et al.,
2012), particularly when uncertainty is high, social sources
and social dynamics are used to update private values
(Berns, Capra, Moore, & Noussair, 2010; Rendell et al.,
2011; Toelch, Bruce, Meeus, & Reader, 2010; Toelch et al.,
2009).
Despite the recognition of competition as a social pro-
cess, the interplay between competition and changes to
private value estimates has received little attention. One
reason is that many competition experiments are common
value auctions where signals about the common value are
induced (Rutström, 1998) and symmetrical (Kagel & Levin,
2008). In common value auctions, social cues (competitor
bids) carry no information, a case rarely occurring under
non-laboratory conditions with auctions mainly being pri-
vate value auctions.
Here, we investigate an important interaction between
differences in (ex ante) private values and the effect of sub-
sequent competition on individuals’ (ex post) private value
estimate. We speciﬁcally test how private values for real
items are inﬂuenced by the bidding behavior in a two
player multiple item repeated all-pay auction game. Cru-
cially, we manipulated auctions such that participants
encountered real competitors with lower, approximately
equal, or higher private value estimates. As participants
bid repeatedly and possibly opted out of the auction by
bidding nothing, bids during these auctions potentially
deviated from private value estimates. To account for this,
we used preference1 statements as a proxy for participants’
private value estimates (Warren, McGraw, & Van Boven,
2011). We speciﬁcally investigated how preference ranks
of the auction items changed because of both the overall
level of competition and the dynamics of the auctions across
the session. For this, participants ranked items by preference
before and after the game. We then linked behavioral
parameters from the bid progression within auctions to par-
ticipants’ propensity to change their preference for a partic-
ular item.2. Materials and methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were recruited from a local participant pool
via email invitation. In total 42 (17 male) participants
played the game in pairs of two with a maximum of four
players per session (10 same gender pairs and 11 mixed
gender pairs; sample size calculations can be found in
the SI). After the experiment, participants answered a
questionnaire where we collected background information1 Tendency to consider something desirable or undesirable.like age and gender. Additionally we asked participants to
give verbatim description of their strategies during the
game. All procedures comply with APA guidelines and
were approved by the Ethics board at Charité University
hospital (EA1/212/11).
2.2. Auction game
Players played a ﬁrst-bid all pay auction game for ﬁve
different real items in pairs. Prior to playing the actual
game participants received a training of 20 rounds to
familiarise them with the controls and the mechanics of
the game. During this training, the ﬁve auction items were
replaced by abstract ﬁgures. After training, players could
inspect the available auction items. All items (candle, pens,
box of chocolate, one-way camera, herbal tea) were pur-
chased at approximately the same price (4.5–5.0 Euro).
The price of the items was not revealed to the participants.
After inspection, players ranked the items according to
their preference with 1 denoting the lowest and 5 the high-
est preference.
Participants played 200 auctions (40 for each item) ran-
domly interspersed. In each round, players could distribute
100 points either to the auction item or to a monetary lot-
tery with a price of seven Euro, which was higher than the
actual cost of each item. The player with the highest
amount of points allotted to the auction would win the
round. The points allocated to the lottery (divided by
100) represented the chance to win seven Euro in this
round. For example, take two players who bid for an item.
Player 1 bids 25 points and player 2 bids 40 points. In this
round player 2 wins the item and has an additional chance
of 60% to win seven Euro. Player 1 does not win the auction
but has a 75% chance to win the lottery. We deliberately
chose a lottery as second investment options for players
to minimize decision biases due to risk sensitivity. That
is, allocating points in either auction or lottery entailed
the risk of losing points. Overbidding in our case occurred
when the sum of both players’ bids exceeded 71 (approxi-
mate value of each item: ﬁve Euro equaling 71 points).
These calculations were not revealed to the participants.
At the end of the game participants had to rank the items
again for preference. One round was randomly selected for
each player and the outcome was paid to each participant.
In other words, participants could actually win one of the
items and an additional seven Euro. Participants who did
not win either received three Euro alone. All participants
received an additional show-up fee of ﬁve Euro. To assess
participants’ private value for each item participants did
not receive feedback on the outcome of the auction in the
ﬁrst ﬁve rounds of the experimentwhere all ﬁve itemswere
presented. In all other rounds participants received feed-
back on whether they won the auction but not the lottery
and how much the other player bid for the item.
2.3. Manipulation of preferences
Since we were interested in exploring the interaction
between private value, social inﬂuences, and competitive-
ness of the environment, we performed a manipulation
on the items players saw in each round by matching pref-
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preferences participants gave prior to the auction. A pair of
players would bid on the item with the same preference,
which was not necessarily the same item. For example,
player 1 chose the candle as third preference and player
2 chose the pens as third preference so that in one round
player 1 would bid for the candle while player two would
bid for the pens. To create conditions with high differences
between the two initial bids we also switched items of
preference 2 and 4 for one of the two players in a pair. This
resulted in player 1 seeing the item with the second pref-
erence and player 2 seeing the item with the fourth prefer-
ence and vice versa. This effectively created three
conditions where players encountered higher, equal, or
lower initial bids. Players were not informed about this
manipulation and remained unaware of this manipulation
during the whole experiment.
2.4. Sample size calculation
Our sample size calculations were based on a pilot
study with 10 participant pairs (n = 20). This study was
similar in design but participants were not matched via
preferences in the auctions. Pooling data from all prefer-
ences, we conducted an OLS regression with the change
in the amount a participant bid over the course of an auc-
tion (dependent variable) and the initial difference
between the two competitors (independent variable). In
the main results, we report a similar regression that takes
the multilevel structure of the data into account. For this
regression, we obtained a slope of 0.58. From this, we cal-
culated the sample size by assuming an alpha level of 0.05
and a beta level of 0.2. To detect a slope that is different
from 0 with an estimated slope of 0.5 one would need
more than 26 subjects. To account for possible outliers
we aimed for a total number of participants between 40
and 50. Calculations were conducted with G*Power 3.1.7.
2.5. Analysis
For descriptive statistics, we calculated the conﬁdence
intervals via bootstrapping (10,000 iterations). For the
analysis of the bidding behavior, we obtained repeated
measures (bids) for each player for each item. We modeled
players’ behavior via linear mixed models (package lme4
under R 3.0.2) with a random effect on the intercept for
each player. We restricted our analysis to the three inter-
mediate preference levels since we found bids of 100 and
0 frequently in the other two conditions imposing ceiling
and ﬂoor effects on the bids and evolution of bids. These
effects potentially distort effect estimates and associated
standard errors of mixed models and with that impair
inference. We selected linear mixed models based on Devi-
ance information criterion (DIC). Our starting model con-
sisted of all ﬁxed effects and their respective two-way
interactions. The ﬁnal models were examined for patterns
in the residuals (deviation from normality via QQ-plots,
pattern ﬁtted values vs. residuals).
For the analysis of preference changes, we compared the
ranking of each item before and after the game that players
had engaged in again limiting the analysis to the three inter-mediate preference levels. We modeled change as a multi-
nomial model with no change, increase, and decrease of
preference as dependent variables. We thus tested for the
inﬂuence of factors that increased the likelihood that a
player increased or decreased their preference in compari-
son tono change auction games.We included thepreference
level, the initial difference between the bids of the two play-
ers, the development of the bids compared from ﬁrst to last
trials, the number of wins and losses in a game, and the
points that were lost during the a game as dependent vari-
ables. The latter two variables were included as they reﬂect
competition strength between players. That is, the number
of auctions a player loses is not a good indicator in itself
for strong competition whereas loosing frequently in com-
bination with loosing high amounts of points is. For the
same reason a low amount of lost points will not indicate
that a player won frequently. Only both variables together,
even though related, give a balanced account of the compet-
itive situation in each auction game. We also included the
two-way interactions for all variables except for the prefer-
ence level.We selected our ﬁnalmodel based on theDIC.We
removed interaction termsand startedwith effectswith low
effect size and wide conﬁdence interval. We retained all
interactions in the model that did not yield a reduction of
DIC in the reducedmodel. Aswe collected several non-inde-
pendent preference rankings for each player, we modeled
player bids as a randomeffect on each intercept for the three
preference levels. All continuous variables were z-trans-
formed prior to ﬁtting. We ﬁtted the model via the
MCMCglmm (Hadﬁeld, 2010) package under R 3.0.2. We
used an unspeciﬁed variance–covariancematrix for random
effects and residuals allowing for unconstrained correlation
in random effects and residuals. We speciﬁed priors for the
residual variance as ﬁxed. The variance for categorical
dependent variables cannot be estimated since it is equal
to the mean. Priors for the variance covariance for the ran-
dom effect were assumed inverse Wishart distributed and
parameterized as weakly informative. Final models were
run for 1,000,000 iterations with a burn in of 50,000 and a
thinning interval of 100. This resulted in effective sample
sizes for each parameter >1000. We checked chain conver-
gence by visually inspecting chain behavior.We further cal-
culated the Geweke diagnostic (all values were below
2*standard error) and checked for autocorrelations within
chains. Raw data and R analysis scripts are available via ﬁg-
share (http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.ﬁgshare.1096225).3. Results
Our experimental manipulation aimed at pairing partic-
ipants such that they played against a player with lower,
about equal, or higher private value (condition abbrevia-
tions: PV+, PV±, PV). Because of this manipulation, the
absolute difference between the initial bids of a player pair
in the PV+ and PV condition was higher than in the PV±
condition (MPV+; PV = 42.3, 95% CI [35.8; 48.8]; MPV± = 24.1,
95% CI [19.1; 29.2]). Initial bids by players were ranked in
the same order as preference statements and increased with
preference level (Fig. 1a). Of all submitted bids players bid
zero points on M = 14.4, 95% CI [8%; 21%] of all trials.
Table 1
Linear mixed model comparing investment difference between ﬁrst ﬁve
and last ﬁve trials across the three preference levels. PV± and PV+ contrasted
with intercept (PV).
Estimate 95% CI
Intercept 3.64 [3.68; 9.93]
PV± 12.35 [19.76; 3.71]
PV+ 11.61 [19.32; 3.03]
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Surprisingly, players reduced their bids over the course
of auctions in the PV± and PV+ conditions measured as the
difference between the mean ﬁrst ﬁve bids and the mean
last ﬁve bids (Fig. 1b and Table 1). Wide conﬁdence inter-
vals of effect estimates (Table 1) indicate that the strength
of reduction was not consistent across players. Indeed,
these differences were, at least partly, driven by the initial
difference between the bids of the two players in the PV±
and PV+ condition (Fig. 2). Players adjusted their bids in
the direction of the bids of the other player, with stronger
adjustments for the player initially bidding more (slope
estimate for interactions <0.5 in Table 2). This resulted in
85% of the participants bidding initially more in the PV+
condition also winning the majority of the auctions. In
the PV± condition only 52% of the players that initially
bid more also won more than half of the auctions.
To examine the effects of underlying dynamics on a
trial-to-trial basis, we focused our analysis on the effect
of the two previous auction outcomes on player’s propen-
sity to increase or decrease their bids. Player bids show a
consistent pattern across all preference levels where play-
ers increased their bids when losing and decreased their
bids when winning (Table 3). The positive effect on bids
was slightly larger when players ﬁrst won and then lost
with regard to auctions with one particular item.3.2. Preference changes
As ﬁnal player bids did not reﬂect the preference for an
item, we analyzed pre- and post-auction preference state-
ments for the ﬁve auction items. A considerable number of
players (66.6%) changed their preference ranking. Our
main goal was to identify factors from the auction that
inﬂuence player preference changes, an index for private
value change. We found that the initial difference between
player bids and the evolution of bids for a particular item
affected bid dynamics (see Results on dynamics during
the auction). Two additional factors entered the analysis
as measures for the degree of competition: sunk costs,
i.e. amount points lost in auctions, and the number of wins
minus the number of losses.Fig. 1. Players change their bids over the course of the experiment. (a) Players in
PV; PV±; PV+. (b) Players decreased their bids during the auction in the PV± and
individual jittered data points. Boxplots show the mean and a box containing 5Based on these factors, we constructed a multinomial
model where we contrasted auctions with increasing and
decreasing preference with auctions without a change.
Two patterns emerge from this analysis. First, some model
coefﬁcient estimates for increasing and decreasing prefer-
ence point in the same direction (same sign) with approx-
imately same effect size (Fig. 3 and Table S1). This indicates
that these factors inﬂuence the probability to change pref-
erence in general, i.e. not restricted to increasing or
decreasing changes. The most noteworthy of these factors
was the difference between the two initial bids between
the two players of a pair (ID). Here, the probability for a
change increased when the competitor bid less (ID > 0;
Fig. 3 and Table S1). Moreover, a high number of wins
and high sunk costs (money lost in the auction) decreased
the probability to change preferences.
The second pattern that emerged was characterized by
factors that affected the probability to change differently
(different sign or low/high parameter estimates) for
increases or decreases in preference. Here, we focus on
the most notable effect: the difference between the ﬁrst
and last bids within one player (DFL) and its interaction
with the sum of wins and losses (WL). The single ﬁxed
effect of DFL is negative and twice as large for increasing
as for decreasing preference changes. That is, players that
increased their bids over the course of the experiment
(DFL < 0) have a higher likelihood to increase their prefer-
ences (Fig. 3 and Table S1). The interaction between DFL
and WL for decreasing preference changes is positive
whereas the same effect for increasing preference changes
is negligible. That is, players who win often and conse-
quently decrease their bids (DFL > 0) manifest a higher
likelihood of decreasing their preferences (Figs. 3 and S1).itially bid more for items with higher preferences with increasing bids for
PV+ condition (see also Table 1) compared to their initial bids. Points are
0% of the data. Whiskers denote a 1.5 interquartile range.
Fig. 2. Players adjust their bid towards their competitor’s bids in the PV± and PV+ condition. In these conditions, there is a clear relationship between the
initial difference between the two player bids and the difference between the initial bid of a player and the last ﬁve bids of this player. The effect is less
strong in the PV condition. Depicted regression lines are derived from a linear regression. For a detailed linear mixed model see Table 2.
Table 2
Linear mixed model relating the inﬂuence of preference level and difference
between the initial bids in a player pair on the development of bids
between the ﬁrst ﬁve and last ﬁve bids of each player. The ‘:’ denotes an
interaction.
Estimate 95% CI
Intercept 0.28 [11.78; 10.94]
Initial Difference (ID) 0.13 [0.11; 0.37]
PV± 5.45 [18.20; 7.23]
PV+ 2.00 [13.43; 17.83]
ID: PV± 0.36 [0.05; 0.67]
ID:PV+ 0.35 [0.05; 0.67]
Table 3
Linear mixed model relating the change in bids between two successive
rounds to the outcomes of the auctions in the two preceding rounds. LL:
lose twice; LW: lose then win; WL: win then lose; WW: win twice in the
previous rounds. We also explored a model with interactions between
preference level and events that did not result in a decreased DIC.
Estimate 95% CI
LL 1.93 [0.92; 2.86]
LW 8.51 [10.29; 6.77]
WL 7.30 [5.48; 8.94]
WW 3.82 [5.48; 8.94]
PV± 0.69 [0.60; 1.96]
PV+ 1.62 [0.30; 2.95]
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Our ﬁndings highlight a bidirectional inﬂuence between
competitive social interactions and individuals’ prefer-
ences. We show that high competition increased prefer-
ence and low competition decreased preferences.
Crucially, the dynamics during the auction had a profound
effect on these preference changes, which occurred mainly
when participants initially bid more than their competitor.
The successive evolution of bids then determined whetherplayers increased or decreased their preference. With con-
stant or increasing bids over the course of the auction par-
ticipants increased their preference. By contrast, when
competition allowed a decrease of bids, accompanied by
a high number of wins throughout the auction, partici-
pants preferred this item less. That is, participants paid less
than anticipated for a desired item, which resulted in a
lower preference rank.
We further observed that participants did not reduce
their bids to a minimum, i.e. initial value of the competitor
plus some small amount. They were only able to realize a
reduction from the initial difference of approximately
40–60 % towards their ﬁnal bids (Fig. 2). On preference
level 3 this resulted mainly from an increase in the bids
of the other participant. On preference level 2 there was
no signiﬁcant increase of participants’ bids towards the
bid of a competitor who bid for the item on preference
level 4. There was, however, also no general reduction
and eight participants showed an increase in bids of over
25 points (Fig. 2). One possible interpretation is that, even
though this was achieved at considerable costs, partici-
pants were unwilling to surrender the item at low cost to
the competitor and thus preventing a ‘‘good deal’’ for their
opponent. Some participants reported in the post experi-
mental questionnaire that they were actively bidding for
less preferred items since it elicited positive emotions,
e.g. ‘for fun I gambled for the items presumably preferred by
the other player’; ‘Initially I bid according to my preferences
but after a while it was more about winning’. The strategy
descriptions of the majority of players, however, are best
captured by the statement of one player ‘I made choices
according to the value of the item’.
The bid dynamics we ﬁnd, replicate ﬁndings from previ-
ous studies; players reduced their bids over the course of
auctions (Gneezy & Smorodinsky, 2006; Sheremeta &
Zhang, 2010), adjust their bids in the direction of compet-
itor (Cason, Sheremeta, & Zhang, 2012), and increase their
Fig. 3. Parameter estimates (posterior means; error bars denote the 95% highest posterior density interval) of a Bayesian multinomial generalised linear
mixed model. As dependent variable, we coded each auction as either increasing, decreasing, or no preference change for each player.
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(Kuhnen & Tymula, 2011). Over and beyond bid dynamics,
our ﬁndings extend theories of decision driven preference
change (Jarcho, Berkman, & Lieberman, 2011; Sharot,
Martino, & Dolan, 2009) by showing that changes in prefer-
ence are evoked by interactions between competitors. Sur-
prisingly, winning an auction had differential effects on
competitors’ private value estimates. When social informa-
tion conﬁrmed one’s private value estimate, winning
resulted in an increase in private values. When social infor-
mation indicated a lower item value, however, winning
resulted in decreased private values. It is possible that
incrementing bids (as in English auctions) might lead to
an update of a bidder’s private value of an item. This seems
particularly likely when uncertainty about the private
value is high, e.g. art auctions, since social information will
then receive a strong weight (Henrich & Boyd, 1998;
Toelch, Bach, & Dolan, 2013; Toelch, Bruce, Newson,
Richerson, & Reader, 2014). Support for this view comes
from experiments investigating repeated bidding in one
shot auctions. Here, repeated feedback on the common
value reduces overbidding, because trial and error learning
strengthens the weight given to individual information
(Dyer, Kagel, & Levin, 1989; Garvin & Kagel, 1994;
Lugovskyy, Puzzello, & Tucker, 2010; Milgrom & Weber,
1982; Potters, de Vries, & van Winden, 1998). Along the
same lines, a reduction of uncertainty by the seller
increases the effectiveness of the auction by reducing over-
bidding (Goeree & Offerman, 2003).
The ﬁndings have important implications for under-
standing bidding behavior in auctions. While competitive
arousal (Ku et al., 2005) or the joy of winning respectively
fear of losing (Bos et al., 2013; Delgado et al., 2008) can
impact bidding decisions within common value auctions,
we show that information derived from competitors’ bids
and subsequent auction dynamics sustainably inﬂuence
private value estimates. These ﬁndings suggest that indi-
viduals use social information as a proxy for the private
value of an item and adjust their own private value esti-
mate accordingly. This use of social information to reduceuncertainty has been demonstrated frequently and shown
to be adaptive under a wide range of tasks (Kendal, Coolen,
& Laland, 2009; Rendell et al., 2010). Individuals’ devia-
tions from optimality predictions in auction theory thus
ﬁt a more general account that involves an evolved, and
thus adaptive, psychological state in humans where social
cues are weighted strongly in decision-making (Perreault,
Moya, & Boyd, 2012; Toelch et al., 2013). The balance
between social and personal information is then estab-
lished through trial and error learning (Behrens, Hunt,
Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008; Richerson & Boyd, 2004).
Common value auctions, for example, demand a reliance
on individual information (estimated price and estimation
error) and a neglect of competitors’ bids to bid optimally. It
is thus possible that some auction experiments create
environments where our proclivity to harvest social infor-
mation leads to suboptimal decisions as seen in
overbidding.
Several explanations have been proposed to explain
overbidding in all-pay auctions (Sheremeta, 2013).
Bounded rationality for example predicts that competitors
increase overbidding with higher endowment. While it is
possible that our per round endowment of seven Euro
inﬂuenced overall overbidding rates, this explanation is
not sufﬁcient to explain the within player differences
because endowments were equal across items respectively
preferences. The utility of winning, as mentioned above, is
also a possible cause for overbidding. While we cannot
fully exclude this possibility, overbidding is happening
rarely in the low preference condition. Here, only few play-
ers increase their bids over the course of the experiment. If
winning an item yielded a higher utility, we again would
expect similar effects across preference levels. The two
aforementioned effects could potentially scale with the ini-
tial preference of the player resulting in stronger effects for
high preference items. Another alternative proposed in the
literature is the escalation of commitment (Staw, 1981)
where competitors once committed to an action will
increase their investment. The social dynamics observed
in our experiment could strengthen the escalation, partic-
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mates (as in the PV± condition) and start overbidding each
other. The escalation of commitment led to sunk costs for
both players, which in turn reduced the propensity of a
competitor to change their preference. Further investiga-
tions in this issue will reveal how exactly sunk costs and
escalation of commitment interact with preferences.
In conclusion, our results highlight the fact that private
value estimates of others, revealed through competitive
interactions, contribute signiﬁcantly in establishing one’s
own true preferences. As preferences change frequently
in our experiment, a major question that arises is how last-
ing these newly established preferences are. Uncovering
how competitive interactions modulate general prefer-
ences, not only for single items, can further aid our under-
standing of human preference formation.Acknowledgments
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